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This book examines how research and evaluation have been con-
ducted, and what public policy use has been made of research with 
respect to employment and training programs over the past 25 years. 
It focuses particularly on a series of social science experiments that 
were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s and their relationship to public 
policy, legislation, and programs. The book also looks more broadly at 
the effect of a larger body of research on public policy regarding reem-
ployment services and training. Mostly it focuses on the research and 
programs designed to help dislocated workers become reemployed. The 
theme throughout the book is that rigorous research can have, and has 
had, a strong and positive impact on public policy. 
But this book also examines instances in which the research find-
ings have been ignored, contravened, or suppressed. A summary con-
clusion of this book is that federal policymakers made good use of 
sound research findings in the mid-1980s and again in the mid-1990s, 
but frequently misused research findings in the 2000s. To a significant 
extent, the book follows the story of the employment and training social 
science experiments that identified three cost-effective, targeted inter-
ventions: 1) comprehensive job search assistance, 2) self-employment 
assistance, and 3) reemployment bonuses. All three were pursued as 
policy options, and two were enacted into federal law. 
Much of this book deals with issues with which I have been closely 
associated during my tenure at the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). 
I was in charge of unemployment insurance (UI) research during the 
1980s and 1990s, when I developed and managed the UI Experiments.1 
As deputy director of the office that conducted research, actuarial anal-
ysis, and legislative activities, I sought to have the results of applied 
research guide policy and legislation. I later directed research for the 
department’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA). As a 
result, this book follows the flow of policy development from research 









Worker dislocation emerged as a problem in the 1970s. At first, the 
problem was largely experienced by blue-collar workers as the United 
States deindustrialized. Later, worker dislocation became more wide-
spread, affecting a broad spectrum of workers. Today, most layoffs are 
permanent, and there are relatively fewer temporary layoffs even during 
recessionary periods. 
The Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program is the first line 
of defense for dislocated workers—i.e., experienced workers who per-
manently lose their jobs. Because of dislocated workers’ strong attach-
ment to the labor force, they are nearly all eligible for UI, and if they are 
unemployed for any length of time, nearly all of them collect UI. 
As a result, UI policymakers began to explore ways that UI, 
together with other workforce development programs, could adapt 
and facilitate the transition of dislocated workers into new jobs. 
Researchers and policymakers explored numerous ways to accom-
plish this goal. This book examines a wide variety of reemployment 
services research, but it focuses mainly on reemployment services that 
researchers have tested using experimental methods. Specifically, the 
UI Experiments examined five different ways to help UI claimants 
return to work: 1) comprehensive job search assistance, 2) reemploy-
ment bonuses, 3) short-term training, 4) relocation assistance, and
5) self-employment assistance. Each of these approaches was tested 
one or more times during the life of the UI Experiments. 
The experiments received guidance from two secretaries of labor— 
Bill Brock and Robert Reich. Brock became secretary of labor in April 
1985. That September, he approved the New Jersey Experiment and 
provided it with funding. He also secured funding for other experiments 
through a new initiative in the fiscal year 1987 federal budget. While he 
was secretary, he gave speeches in which he emphasized the potential 
importance of these experiments in developing policies to assist dis-
located workers, even though he would no longer be secretary at their 
completion. 
In early 1993, Reich became secretary of labor. He and his staff 
examined the results of the experiments that had been authorized by 






first year as labor secretary, Reich supported two legislative provisions, 
one that provided comprehensive job search assistance to dislocated 
workers and another that made self-employment assistance available to 
these workers if they wanted to start their own microenterprises. Con-
gress enacted legislation including these initiatives before the end of 
Reich’s first year in office. 
The UI Experiments generated a number of policy initiatives. In 
1993, Congress enacted Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
(WPRS) legislation, which authorizes the provision of comprehensive 
job search assistance services that were tested in the New Jersey Experi-
ment. Congress also made Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) a tempo-
rary UI program in 1993 based on the Massachusetts self-employment 
experiment. The program was made permanent in 1998 (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1  The Unemployment Insurance Experiments: Evaluations and 
Legislative Activity 


















1989—final report 1993—Worker Profiling 
1991—four-year and Reemployment 
follow-up Services (enacted) 
1995—six-year 
follow-up 
1991—interim report 1993—Self-Employment 
Assistance (enacted for 
five years) 
1995—final report 1998—Self-Employment 
Assistance (permanently 
enacted) 
1987—final report 1994—Reemployment Act 
1989—final report (not enacted) 
2002—final report 
2002—final report 
2003 and 2005—Personal 
Reemployment Accounts 
(not enacted) 
2006—first “final” 2006—Career 








Although four reemployment bonus experiments and subsequent 
analyses made the case for enacting reemployment bonuses as part 
of the Unemployment Insurance Program as an incentive to speed re-
employment, no reemployment bonus provision was ever enacted. The 
Clinton administration proposed reemployment bonuses as part of the 
Reemployment Act of 1994—a legislative proposal that was an unsuc-
cessful attempt to replace the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). 
Reemployment bonus policy was reborn in George W. Bush’s admin-
istration, which twice proposed Personal Reemployment Accounts 
(PRAs), once as a free-standing bill and again as part of a bill reau-
thorizing the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). Neither proposal was 
enacted. 
The Individual Training Account (ITA) Experiment tested three 
approaches to training, including a “free choice” model that the Bush 
administration used to justify its 2006 Career Advancement Accounts 
(CAA) proposal as the centerpiece for WIAreauthorization. But because 
there was little prior research or usage of the model, the justification 
was weak, and the legislative proposal went nowhere. 
A work sharing experiment was planned, but it was never carried 
out. Nevertheless, work sharing was enacted as a temporary federal 
program in 1982 and as a permanent program in 1992. Wage supple-
ment experiments were proposed twice, but they were never conducted. 
Despite the lack of testing, wage supplements became part of the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in 2002. 
Other policy initiatives were made that flew in the face of research 
findings. Despite findings that reemployment services are cost-effective,
funding for the Reemployment Services Grants to states—used to pro-
vide services under the WPRS program—were eliminated in June 2006. 
Although the Employment Service’s (ES) provision of job matching 
and other employment services had been found to be cost-effective, 
the Bush administration repeatedly proposed eliminating the ES and 
rolling its funds into block grants to the states. Similarly, the national 
automated labor exchange system—America’s Job Bank—was evalu-
ated and found to be cost-effective. Nevertheless, it was eliminated in 
June 2007. 
The umbrella term “Unemployment Insurance Experiments”— 
described below—is used for several reasons. The experiments all 






The experiments mostly were administered by staff in the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Service rather than elsewhere in the Department of 
Labor.2 The policy recommendations that have stemmed from evalua-
tions of the experiments generally have involved amendments to fed-
eral UI legislation. The demonstration designs of two UI Experiments 
have been translated into programs and have been enacted as permanent 
provisions of UI law—the WPRS and the SEA programs. 
This book reviews a wide spectrum of research—experimental and 
nonexperimental—that sheds light on the effectiveness of reemploy-
ment services and reemployment incentives that have implications for 
public policy. Research other than the UI Experiments that is relevant 
to public policy also is included. Going beyond the research itself, this 
book examines the public policy response to these experiments and 
other related research. In general, this book considers both the effects 
on public policy when research results are considered, and the effects 
on public policy when research results are ignored. 
OVERVIEW OF ThE ExPERImENTS 
The UI Experiments represented an enormous effort by the USDOL. 
The experiments all used rigorous evaluation methods to try to develop 
practical, cost-effective policies. They involved a substantial commit-
ment of the department’s research funds and staff. They were based on 
close and cooperative relationships between departmental staff, com-
puter contractors, research contractors, and state and local staff from 
state workforce agencies. 
Random Assignment 
From a federal policy perspective, random assignment experi-
ments offer the best hope of determining what works and what does 
not work. Once researchers agree that an approach works, it becomes 
easier to forge a consensus among policymakers on whether to imple-
ment interventions. 
There is broad consensus among researchers that random assign-
ment experiments are a valuable tool for developing public policy. 
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There is, however, disagreement about when and where to use experi-
ments, what the balance should be between the use of experimental and 
quasiexperimental (comparison group) methods, and which economet-
ric methods to use (Berlin 2007; Burtless 1995; Heckman, LaLonde, 
and Smith 1999; Nathan and Hollister 2008). The department has 
used a mixed approach to its program evaluations—a combination of 
experimental, quasiexperimental, and econometric methods to evaluate 
programs, depending on a number of different factors (Balducchi and 
Wandner 2009). 
The UI Experiments were conducted at a time when employing 
experimental methods was highly desirable if legislative change was 
going to be accomplished. Sustaining old programs or developing new 
programs required convincing policymakers in the executive branch and 
Congress, as well as stakeholders in the programs, that policy changes 
were justified. During most of the period in which the experiments were 
conducted, the executive branch and Congress were controlled by dif-
ferent political parties. Divided government made it particularly diffi-
cult to obtain consensus on new policy directions. Random assignment 
experiments facilitated gaining agreement on the policy options that 
were tested. 
Overview of the Demonstration Projects 
The UI Experiments tested a number of different interventions 
that were designed to help displaced UI claimants. The interventions 
included comprehensive job search assistance (JSA), reemployment 
bonuses, training and training vouchers, and self-employment assis-
tance. The experiments stemmed from a desire to both improve exist-
ing interventions (such as JSA and training) and test new interventions 
(such as reemployment bonuses, self-employment assistance, and train-
ing vouchers). In addition, the Department of Labor sought to use ran-
dom assignment methods to test work sharing and wage supplements, 
but neither of those experiments came to fruition. 
The UI Experiments were expensive to conduct and represented a 
significant but minority portion of the department’s research budget for 
employment and training programs. The cost of the UI Experiments can 
be broken down into operational costs and research costs. The opera-












force Investment Boards (WIBs) that participated in the demonstration 
projects. These agencies agreed to carry out the interventions that were 
proposed. Research funds were provided to private research firms that 
were selected to design, monitor, and evaluate the projects. Operational 
costs were approximately $24 million for the 11 demonstrations, for an 
average of approximately $2.2 million per demonstration, and varied 
from no cost to nearly $6 million (Table 1.2). Those costs included the 
treatments themselves as well as administrative funds for the states or 
localities that operated the demonstrations. 
In addition to the operational costs, total research costs for the 11 
experiments amounted to more than $18 million, or an average cost 
per experiment of less than $1.7 million. However, the last three dem-
onstration projects cost much more than those that were operated in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Funding for the experiments initially 
came largely from JTPA funds and later from WIA appropriations for 
research and evaluations. The UI Experiments staff obtained USDOL
research and demonstration funding. In two cases, however, the fund-
ing for the experiments came from the federal portion of the Unem-
ployment Trust Fund (UTF). Federal legislation mandated UTF funding 
both for the JSA Demonstration in Florida and Washington, DC, and 
for the Massachusetts SEA Demonstration. The UTF was available as 
a funding source because the demonstrations provided reemployment 
services to UI beneficiaries. 
The responsibilities of the research contractors consisted of design-
ing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating costs. To facilitate proj-
ect monitoring and evaluation by the research contractors and depart-
mental staff, project tracking systems were developed; they were used 
for operational purposes, for random assignment of individuals into the 
treatment and control groups, and for gathering administrative data for 
project evaluation. Because the data was entered in real time, the track-
ing system allowed constant monitoring of the quality of the opera-
tions. Moreover, in the case of the reemployment bonus demonstra-
tions, tracking was used to determine when to stop project enrollment to 
ensure that the project did not go over budget. Evaluation costs included 
the collection of project and administrative data, the administration of 
telephone surveys, and the conducting of implementation, net impact, 




8   Table 1.2  U.S. Department of Labor Experiments, 1986 to Present: Descriptive Information 
Number of Number Funding 
Experiment Dates treatments Sample sizea of sites Partners (millions $) 
UI Experiments 
New Jersey Experiment 1986–87 3 T = 8,675; C = 2,385 10 State 3.4b 
Pennsylvania Reemployment 1988–89 4 T = 11,410; C = 3,595 12 State 2.2 
Bonus Experiment 
Washington Reemployment Bonus 1988–90 6 N = 17,000 21 State 1.1c 
Experiment 
Massachusetts SEA Experiment 1990–93 1 T = 755; C = 752 7 State UTFd 
Washington SEA Experiment 1989–91 1 T = 614; C = 608 6 State ca. 5.0 
D.C. JSA Experiment 1995–96 3 N = 8,071 1e State UTF = 1.3d,f 
Florida JSA Experiment 1995–96 3 N = 12,042 10 State UTF = 1.4d,f 
Maryland Work Search Experiment 1994–95 4 N = 27,000+ 6 State ca. 0.25g 
Other Related Experiments 
Lifelong Learning Experiment 1995–97 1 T = 104,668 12h Educational 0.0i 
ITA Experiment, original 2000–04 3 T = 7,922; C = 0 8 Local boards 4.3 
Project GATE 2003–04 1 T = 2,097; C = 2,104 5 3 states 4.0 
a T = treatment group; C = control group; N = sample. 
b Mathematica Policy Research was funded by the New Jersey Department of Labor from an overall grant to conduct the New Jersey 
Experiment. The total cost of $4.7 million was split between research costs of $1.3 million and operational costs of $3.4 million. 
c The Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment was originally funded from USDOL research funds in the amount of $1.0 million. 
The Upjohn Institute conducted the design, monitoring, and evaluation of the experiment with its own funds, but it received supplemental 
research funding in the amount of $90,000 from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
d UTF = Unemployment Trust Fund. For the Massachusetts SEA and the Florida and District of Columbia JSA experiments, the states were 
able to draw funds from their state UTF accounts to pay for self-employment allowances and for job search assistance. In both cases, the 
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e JSA services were provided by one site, but participants were selected based on their UI claims at all local UI offices, including those in 
suburban Maryland and Virginia, where D.C. claimants could file D.C. claims for D.C. benefits. 
f For the JSA Experiment, the funding source was the Unemployment Trust Fund. Decker et al. (2000, p. 68) put the total UTF-funded 
demonstration costs at $1,301,267 for D.C. and $1,356,659 for Florida. Greenberg and Shroder (2004) put the combined cost of the two 
demonstration projects at $2.68 million. 
g For the Maryland Work Search Experiment, Greenberg and Shroder (2004) put the cost at $250,000. But in an e-mail message to me 
on November 16, 2007, Michelle Wood said that all funding went to Abt, in the amount of $248,000. There is no indication of funding 
provided to Maryland to conduct the demonstration. This figure was confirmed by a February 25, 2008, telephone interview with Tom 
Wendell, Maryland UI director. 
h Twelve Baltimore-area institutions participated, including community colleges, private career colleges, and four-year colleges and uni-
versities.
i A portion of the funding provided to Abt for the Lifelong Learning Demonstration was used to operate the project, but no funding was 
given directly to the state of Maryland or to the educational institutions, so the amount is shown as 0. 






The UI Experiments generally tested a single intervention, but they 
frequently included multiple treatment groups to test design features 
such as the method of providing the treatment or the payment level 
for a reemployment bonus. The New Jersey Experiment, however, was 
more ambitious and tested three different treatments: 1) comprehensive 
job search assistance, 2) training (and relocation allowances), and 3) 
reemployment bonuses. 
Most of the UI Experiments offered reemployment services or 
incentives to a large group of individuals. Sample sizes of the treatment 
and control groups had to be sufficiently large to allow for evaluation 
of treatment impact both in the aggregate and with respect to important 
subgroups. Workers were randomly assigned to treatment or control 
groups in all experiments except the training voucher experiment. In 
that case, training vouchers had already been mandated by the WIA, 
so three different approaches to providing training vouchers were com-
pared to one another rather than to a control group. 
The Players and the Process: The Executive Branch and Congress 
The UI Experiments would not have been carried out without the 
support of departmental policymakers, Congress, and state and local 
workforce agencies. The department took the lead in initiating the 
experiments, administering them, proposing policy initiatives, and 
implementing the two new programs that flowed from them. In 1985, 
I had proposed the experiments for consideration by the incoming sec-
retary of labor, William Brock.3 Secretary Brock previously had been 
United States Trade Representative, the country’s chief trade negotia-
tor; in that capacity, he had been concerned about the plight of Ameri-
can workers dislocated by the effects of international trade. He quickly 
supported the experiments as a new departmental initiative. Indeed, he 
went to the Office of Management and Budget and gained support for 
a special appropriation to begin the experiments. A number of assistant 
secretaries for Employment and Training and many other policymakers 
and staff also supported the experiments. 
The final evaluation of the New Jersey Experiment was completed 
in 1989, and an interim evaluation of the SEA experiments was com-
pleted in 1992. In 1993, Secretary Reich used these findings to pro-










job search assistance component of the New Jersey Experiment, and 
2) SEA, based on the Massachusetts SEA Demonstration. The Clin-
ton administration supported these two initiatives, and administration 
staff members were able to gain bipartisan congressional support for 
both initiatives. General confidence in the integrity of the evaluations 
of these two interventions helped them to garner widespread support. 
Congress supported the UI Experiments at their inception in 1985 
and appropriated $5.0 million to fund some of the experiments in 1986. 
Later, Congress relied on evaluations of the JSA and the Massachusetts 
SEA experiments, and the project designs were the basis for the federal 
legislative proposals. Congress supported the proposals for JSA and 
SEA programs and enacted them into law in 1993. The SEA program 
was enacted with a five-year sunset provision. In 1998, Congress made 
the program permanent. In contrast, Congress considered reemploy-
ment bonuses in 1994 and 2003 but did not authorize states to offer 
them as a means of encouraging the unemployed to return to work. 
Cooperative Effort 
Setting up and operating the UI Experiments was a cooperative 
effort between state, federal, and contractor staff. Labor Department 
staff generally selected the participating state workforce agencies and 
the research contractor with the concurrence of the assistant secretary 
for Employment and Training. State workforce agencies and local 
offices were recruited, although in cases where many states were inter-
ested in participating, competitive selection processes were established. 
The research contractor and USDOL staff secured the interest and sup-
port of states for random assignment methods and the experimental 
design of the project. Participating state and local staff were trained so 
that they could carry out the experimental design. State and local staff 
then operated the demonstration project. 
Close monitoring of the experiments by USDOL staff and the 
research contractors helped ensure that they were carried out as they 
had been designed. In many cases, state work agency staff from the 
state central office also participated in the monitoring. 
The evaluations of the experiments were conducted by research 
contractors but with the close cooperation of Labor Department staff. 
Evaluations required the gathering of high-quality project and adminis-
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trative data from the states. Expensive surveys conducted by the evalu-
ators provided input to the evaluation. The survey data were needed 
when the project evaluation required more than UI wage records— 
employment, earnings, and retention data—to measure project out-
comes. When the evaluations were completed, the department reviewed 
and commented on the evaluation reports before accepting them. 
The Players and the Process, Part 2: The State 
Workforce Agencies 
State workforce agencies and the local offices that run their pro-
grams often do not like random assignment projects. Random assign-
ment is a rigorous process that is very different from the way individu-
als are normally selected to participate in reemployment services in 
ongoing programs. The idea of random assignment is sometimes seen 
as inequitable, whereas describing this approach as a “lottery” is more 
easily understood and supported.4 
The UI Experiments were carefully designed to test the treatments 
while not interfering with the regular operations of the UI, the ES, or 
training programs. State program administrators would not support 
demonstration projects that interfered with the daily operations of their 
programs or with the state computer systems that are critical for their 
operation. 
The state workforce agencies played a crucial role: they volunteered 
to participate in the experiments, participated in developing the dem-
onstration designs, implemented the demonstrations, provided admin-
istrative data, made participating staff available for interviews, and 
facilitated the conducting of the evaluations by the researchers. State 
workforce agencies were involved in all of the projects, although for the 
Lifelong Learning Demonstration the participating organizations were 
a number of Maryland community colleges and universities, and for 
the Individual Training Account Experiment the participating agencies 
were local WIBs. 
When two of the experiments resulted in changes to federal legisla-
tion, the entire state workforce system was affected. Since participation 
in the WPRS initiative became mandatory for state UI programs, all 






pation in the SEA program is voluntary, and fewer than a dozen states 
have been involved in program implementation and operation. 
The Research Contractors That Conducted the UI Experiments 
The UI Experiments were conducted by a relatively small number 
of research contractors because few research firms in the United States 
have experience in running social science experiments for workforce 
programs. In each experiment, a single research group designed, moni-
tored, and evaluated the project. Although consideration was given to 
using different contractors—one to design the project and another to 
evaluate it—that approach was ultimately considered impractical. 
For all of the experiments except the Washington Reemployment 
Bonus Experiment, the contract to design, conduct, and evaluate the 
demonstration project was competitively bid. In the case of the Wash-
ington experiment, the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
offered to conduct the experiment without a fee, so its arrangements 
with the USDOL were contained in a nonfinancial agreement. 
The research contractors used in the experiments were Abt Associ-
ates, Battelle Memorial Institute, IMPAQ International, Mathematica 
Policy Research (MPR), Social Policy Research Associates, and the 
Upjohn Institute. Of the 11 experiment evaluations listed in Table 1.1, 
the principal evaluators of these projects were tightly concentrated: 
MPR evaluated five, Abt three, and Battelle, the Upjohn Institute, and 
IMPAQ International one each (Table 1.3). 
The concentration of evaluators for UI Experiments followed a 
similar pattern for social experiments in general. A review of 70 U.S. 
social science experiments conducted between 1983 and 1996—when 
most of the UI Experiments were initiated—found that 47 percent of 
experiments were evaluated by the “Big Three”: Abt, MDRC, and 
MPR. Of the rest, 19 percent were evaluated by academics, 10 percent 
by government employees, and the remaining 24 percent by a diverse 
group of think tanks and private sector firms. Academics generally 
evaluated smaller experiments, and government employees were gen-
erally the evaluators of state-sponsored experiments (Greenberg and 
Shroder 2004, p. 466). Since the UI Experiments were large in size, the 
dominance of the Big Three is not surprising. Because MDRC works 










Table 1.3  U.S. Department of Labor Experiments, 1986 to Present: 
Research Contractors and Funding Levels 
Contractor funding 
Experiment Contractor (millions $) 
UI Experiments 
New Jersey Experiment MPR 1.23a 
Pennsylvania Reemployment MPR 1.00 
Bonus Experiment 
Washington Reemployment Upjohn Institute Nonfinancial 
Bonus Experiment agreementb 
Massachusetts and Washington Abt/Battelle 1.65 
SEA Experiments 
D.C. and Florida JSA Demos MPR/Battelle 1.50 
Maryland Work Search Demo Abt/Battelle 0.25 
Other experiments 
Lifelong Learning Experiment Abt 2.88c 
ITA Experiment, original MPR/SPRA 3.53d 
Second Survey MPR/SPRA 1.30 
Project GATE IMPAQ/MPR 6.40e 
a Mathematica Policy Research was funded by the New Jersey Department of Labor 
from the overall grant that it was awarded to conduct the New Jersey Experiment. The 
total cost of $4.7 million was split between the research cost of 1.3 million and the 
operational cost of $3.4 million (Greenberg and Shroder 2004). In an e-mail message 
to the author on December 10, 2007, Paul Decker, president of Mathematica Policy 
Research, indicated that, according to Mathematica contract files, the research cost 
was $1.23 million. 
b Self-financed by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, with additional 
research funding provided to the Upjohn Institute by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
USDOL had a nonfinancial agreement with Upjohn to conduct the evaluation. Green-
berg and Shroder (2004) incorrectly indicate that the cost was $450,000. 
c Some of the funding provided to Abt was used for project operations. 
d The contract for $2.2 million was supplemented with $0.7 million in 1998. Greenberg 
and Shroder (2004) put the total at $2.2 million. 
e In a telephone conversation with the author on June 9, 2007, Janet Javar gave the fol-
lowing figures: the MPR contract was for $4,027,990. About $500,000 of that was 
used for the ITA/ETP (Eligible Training Provider) Demonstration, and the balance of 
$3,528,000 was used for the ITA Experiment. 









tions rather than with dislocated workers, it did not bid on any of the 
UI Experiments. 
The USDOL contracted directly with all of the contractors except 
in three cases. For the New Jersey Experiment, the state of New Jersey 
contracted with Mathematica Policy Research. For the Maryland Work 
Search Demonstration, the state of Maryland contracted with Abt Asso-
ciates. For the Washington Reemployment Bonus project, the USDOL
signed a nonfinancial agreement with the Upjohn Institute. 
U.S. Department of Labor Staff 
Within the department, all eight of the UI Experiments were con-
ducted by the Unemployment Insurance Demonstration Group within 
the Unemployment Insurance Service. This group was formed in 
response to the high level of effort required to conduct the experiments. 
The purpose of the group was to conduct the series of demonstration 
projects to determine whether new approaches could be found to help 
dislocated workers—most of whom were also UI claimants—return to 
work. The group formed in 1985 to work on the New Jersey Experiment 
and continued in existence for over a decade, until the last of the eight 
projects had been completed. Three related projects were conducted by 
the staff in the ETA’s Office of Policy Development and Research.5 
Contract computer staff worked along with departmental staff in 
designing, developing, maintaining, and overseeing the data systems. 
They developed an operational and research database that allowed the 
USDOL and the research contractor to monitor and manage the experi-
ments with data that was available in real time. The project data systems 
could be used both to manage the projects and to accumulate the data 
that would be needed to evaluate the demonstrations.6 
ThE UNEmPLOymENT INSURANCE PROgRAm 
The UI Experiments were conducted within the national UI pro-
gram. They were all designed to transform the UI program into a reem-




The UI program was established by the Social Security Act of 1935, 
and it has operated for more than seven decades. It pays unemployment 
insurance benefits to workers who are unemployed through no fault of 
their own. UI benefits replace about half of lost wages up to a maxi-
mum amount that is set by each state. The average weekly payment 
was $300 in 2008. In almost all states, workers can receive up to 26 
weeks of regular benefits. Thus, in normal economic times the aver-
age unemployed worker can receive up to approximately $7,500 while 
unemployed during a year. 
Workers drawing UI must show that they are able, available, and 
actively searching for work. Indeed, they must certify that they are 
searching for work each time they request another UI payment. Workers 
who are permanently separated from their previous jobs must register 
for work with the local Wagner-Peyser Act agency—i.e., the Employ-
ment Service. They must accept a job to which they are referred if that 
job is determined to be suitable. The suitability determination includes 
consideration of whether the job to which the unemployed worker is 
referred pays a wage similar to the worker’s previous job. 
Wagner-Peyser agencies provide a wide variety of reemployment 
services to workers permanently separated from their jobs who receive 
benefits. However, these workers are not assured that they will actu-
ally receive all of the options in the wide spectrum of assistance when 
searching for a new job. Wagner-Peyser agencies target reemployment 
services to individual workers based on a determination of which ser-
vices are likely to work for which individuals. Because of limited fund-
ing, ES staff also have to make allocation decisions among a broad 
group of workers who could benefit from the various possible services. 
Unemployed workers can receive UI benefits whether they are on 
temporary or permanent layoffs, but it is the permanently displaced 
workers who need assistance in finding new jobs. This book therefore 
concentrates on displaced workers and the ways of providing reemploy-
ment services—or reemployment incentives—to them. 
The UI Experiments were established to determine which reem-
ployment services and incentives were most effective in returning per-
manently separated UI beneficiaries to work. It is important to know 
what interventions work so that workers can receive those services that 
will speed their return to work or increase their human capital. 
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In addition, because of limited resources, not all workers can be 
provided all services, even among those services that were determined 
to be effective for a wide variety of unemployed workers. Thus, a sys-
tem of targeting had to be developed. The system of targeting treat-
ments to workers who are most likely to exhaust their entitlement to UI 
benefits is called worker profiling. 
DISLOCATED WORkERS AND ThE NEED FOR
REEmPLOymENT SERVICES 
The UI Experiments focused on UI beneficiaries who were perma-
nently separated from their jobs both because of the increase in worker 
displacement over the preceding decade and because most dislocated 
workers who are unemployed for more than a few weeks collect UI 
benefits. Thus the UI system searched for ways to help these UI ben-
eficiaries speed their return to work or assist them in improving their 
skills through education and training. In addition, at the time the exper-
iments commenced, prior research had concentrated more on disad-
vantaged than on dislocated workers, and more was known about the 
effectiveness of workforce programs for disadvantaged workers than 
for dislocated ones because policymakers were more concerned with 
this population (LaLonde 1995, p. 161). The time was ripe to devote 
federal resources to conducting large-scale experiments to determine 
what worked to help reemploy dislocated workers. 
The targeting of dislocated workers by the UI Experiments was 
atypical: a study of 193 social science experiments that were undertaken 
between 1962 and 1996 found that most of them targeted a population 
of disadvantaged individuals or families. Taken together, these experi-
ments served welfare recipients (35 percent), low-income families (14 
percent), the unemployed (13 percent), and youth (12 percent) (Green-
berg and Shroder 2004, p. 461). The UI Experiments were a subset 
of the 13 percent of experiments serving the unemployed; they served 
the less disadvantaged portion of that population, since they dealt with 
unemployed workers who had had a strong enough attachment to the 
labor force to qualify for unemployment insurance but were neverthe-






ents had prior annual earnings that placed them and their families at 
about double the poverty line, and when these workers become reem-
ployed they are not likely to join the poor. For example, the average 
weekly wage for all workers in UI-covered employment was $854 in 
2007, and the average annual wage in covered employment was over 
$43,000. 
The Problem of Worker Dislocation 
Worker dislocation has been a significant problem in the United 
States over the past three decades. By 1984, the problem was widely 
recognized, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) responded by ini-
tiating a biennial series of special dislocated worker surveys as supple-
ments to the Current Population Survey (CPS), in order to estimate the 
magnitude of the problem and to discern any trends in worker disloca-
tion. These surveys showed that in the 1980s approximately 2 million 
long-tenured workers were dislocated each year. While the numbers 
increased during periods of recession, they remained high in all years, 
even years with relatively low unemployment. In the 1980s, worker 
dislocation was concentrated in the goods-producing sector of the econ-
omy, but there also was significant dislocation among workers in the 
service sector and among white-collar workers (CBO 1993). 
The nature of worker dislocation has changed since the 1980s, 
however, and the problem has become more pervasive. In the 1990s, 
the share of worker dislocation among service-sector and white-collar
workers increased, narrowing the gap relative to goods-producing 
industries (Hipple 1999). While the rate of worker dislocation remained 
higher in manufacturing and construction than in other industries, in 
2002 the actual number of dislocated white-collar workers (1.2 million) 
was almost twice the number of dislocated blue-collar workers (0.65 
million) and nearly 10 times the number of those in service occupa-
tions. The total number of long-tenured dislocated workers in 2002 was 
2.0 million (Helwig 2004). 
The BLS definition of “dislocated workers” is a narrow one, 
restricted to unemployed workers who lost jobs they had held for three 
years or longer because 1) their plant closed, 2) their employer went 
out of business, or 3) their employer laid them off and they were not 





are permanently separated from their previous jobs by their employers. 
A study of UI recipients by Corson and Dynarski (1990) shows that 
while more than half of unemployed workers had no expectation of 
recall, only about 36 percent of them met the BLS definition of worker 
dislocation.7 
In the seven fiscal years from 2000–2001 to 2006–2007, the number 
of unemployed workers collecting a UI first payment varied between 
7.4 million and 10.4 million. In February 2008, the department pro-
jected the number to remain steady at approximately 8 million over the 
next six years (USDOL 2008a). At least half of these UI recipients, or 
approximately 4 million of them, are likely to be permanently separated 
from their jobs and likely will benefit from receiving reemployment 
services. In addition, reemployment services may be needed by workers 
who do not collect UI, including reentrants to the labor force. 
What has changed in the past two decades is that laid-off work-
ers are decreasingly on temporary layoff. For many decades now, the 
permanent layoff rate has been much greater than the temporary layoff 
rate. In addition, the permanent layoff rate always has been, and contin-
ues to be, highly cyclical, increasing sharply in recessionary periods. In 
contrast, while the proportion of workers on temporary layoffs formerly 
was highly cyclical—spiking during recessions—the temporary lay-
off rate is now steady and low over the cycle. Since the mid-1980s, in 
fact, the temporary layoff rate has been relatively flat and has remained 
well below 2 percent. Groshen and Potter (2003, p. 3) find a structural 
change in the U.S. economy with respect to temporary layoffs. “In the 
four recessions before 1990,” they write, “unemployment from tem-
porary layoffs rose throughout the downturn and fell sharply after the 
trough, adding substantially to the run-up and then the decline in total 
unemployment. In the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions, by contrast, tem-
porary layoffs contributed little to the path of unemployment. These 
layoffs barely increased in the 1990–91 recession and figured even less 
importantly in the 2001 recession.” 
With permanent layoffs becoming predominant, more unemployed 
workers need assistance in returning to work. Studies show that dis-
located workers experience substantial earnings loss when they return 
to work (Kletzer 1998). Based on BLS survey data comparing their 
wages before and after unemployment, Farber (1997) estimates that, 










13 percent. Those dislocated also have a tough time finding work: in the 
2001–2003 BLS survey, 35 percent of job losers remained unemployed 
at the survey date, and 13 percent of those who had lost full-time jobs 
were only employed part time (Farber 2005). Dislocated workers also 
experienced longer durations of unemployment before they returned to 
work. 
For those dislocated workers served by the WIA and ES systems, 
there are an array of available services consisting of core, intensive, and 
training services. Because of funding limitations, however, training ser-
vices cannot be made available to all dislocated workers. Since 2002, 
approximately 200,000 WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker program 
participants have received training annually.8 Under the 2006 Bush 
administration proposal that would have replaced much of the employ-
ment and training system with a CAA training voucher, the number 
of workers receiving public training would have increased to between 
500,000 and 600,000 per year. 
Even if CAAs had been implemented, training would have been 
offered to only a small portion of the approximately 2 million workers 
that become dislocated each year and an even smaller portion of all 
UI recipients who are permanently separated. For the vast majority of 
workers, when they come to the department-funded One-Stop Career 
Centers, they can expect to receive no more than the core and intensive 
services available under the WIA and ES programs. As a result, we need 
to look at what is known about the effectiveness of the delivery and 
targeting of comprehensive job search assistance and other reemploy-
ment services. 
Dislocated worker studies reveal that dislocated workers have labor 
force characteristics that can be used for statistical targeting by apply-
ing worker profiling methods. While not all dislocated workers have 
difficulty becoming reemployed, a large portion of those having long 
job tenure are likely to need some type of reemployment assistance. 
Workers who accumulated three years’ tenure or more with their previ-
ous employer have been found to experience longer spells of unem-
ployment and to be more likely to experience a reduction in earnings of 
20 percent or greater than workers with less than three years of tenure 
(CBO 1993). Thus, tenure at job separation may be an important indica-







riencing an earnings loss. This and related findings were considered in 
designing a worker profiling methodology. 
Reemploying Dislocated Workers: The Role of the Unemployment 
Insurance Program 
The traditional role of the unemployment insurance program is to 
pay temporary income support to unemployed workers. UI’s underly-
ing premise is that unemployed workers’ skills will match job vacan-
cies in local labor markets, and that vacancies can be discovered with 
a combination of reasonable search efforts and watchful waiting. This 
premise has determined the states’ basic approach to administering their 
UI programs. State UI programs test whether unemployed workers are 
able, available, and actively seeking work. In most states, program 
administration stresses monitoring workers’ continuing attachment to 
the labor force for those to whom it pays UI benefits, to make sure they 
are searching for work. Providing reemployment services to help them 
return to work has received less emphasis. 
The UI system began paying benefits in 1938, but the UI program 
soon became insignificant with the advent of World War II, a period of 
relatively full employment. From the end of that war through the early 
1970s, workers displaced from their jobs tended to represent a suffi-
ciently small number of all UI claimants that the UI program’s limited 
emphasis on reemployment services appeared warranted. It was only 
with the emergence of worker dislocation as a major phenomenon in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s that the need to provide UI claimants with 
reemployment services emerged.9 
Even today, dislocated workers with long tenure make up only a 
minority of all UI claimants—perhaps one-quarter of the claimants 
served in a year. These workers, however, have needs beyond income 
support, and they frequently have great difficulty returning to work 
without the receipt of reemployment services from the ES or from 
WIA’s Adult and Dislocated Worker programs. 
In recent years, worker dislocation has become an area of increas-
ing concern to the UI program. Overall, the UI program serves just 
half of all dislocated workers. However, the UI system serves nearly 
all dislocated workers likely to experience long-term unemployment, 
the group most in need of reemployment assistance. Many dislocated 
 





workers return to work quickly, even if they have been permanently 
separated, and many of these early returnees never file for UI benefits 
(Vroman 1991, 2008; Wandner and Stengle 1997).10 Thus, over a year, 
UI serves fewer than one-third of the dislocated workers who have been 
unemployed for less than five weeks, but it serves 80 to 90 percent of 
those unemployed for 15 weeks or longer (O’Leary and Wandner 1997). 
This latter group represents the great majority of all dislocated workers 
who need reemployment assistance to obtain new jobs. Because the UI 
program serves these workers when they first become unemployed, it is 
well-positioned to act as a gateway for early referral to reemployment 
services. 
TREATmENTS TESTED AND mEThODS OF EVALUATION 
The treatments provided in the UI Experiments are typical of those 
provided by most social experiments. In a study of the 193 experiments 
started between 1962 and 1996, 293 different treatments were tested. 
Only 26 of these treatments focused on areas outside of employment. 
The 267 employment treatments provided education and training (92), 
job placement and job search assistance (94), information and counsel-
ing (57), and income transfers (24). Thus, the concentration of experi-
mental treatments on employment is common across all organizations 
sponsoring experiments and across all populations served (Greenberg 
and Shroder 2004, p. 461). 
More specifically, the UI Experiments tested the following treat-
ments in the following states or other sites: comprehensive job search 
assistance (Washington, New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Florida, 
and Pennsylvania); training and education (New Jersey, Lifelong Learn-
ing, and ITA experiment sites); reemployment bonuses (New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington state experiments); and self-employment
assistance (Massachusetts and Washington). The fact that there were 
multiple tests of the same treatment generally served three functions: 
1) to verify earlier results (i.e., comprehensive job search assistance 
and reemployment bonuses); 2) to search for more cost-effective 
approaches (i.e., training and education); and 3) to test new reemploy-
ment approaches (i.e., self-employment assistance). 
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Because over 90 percent of the 293 treatments studied by Greenberg 
and Shroder concentrated on employment and work, the evaluations 
of these treatments have tended to concentrate on the same outcomes. 
Four-fifths of the studies begun between 1983 and 1996 examined the 
effect of the treatments on employment and earnings (Greenberg and 
Shroder 2004, p. 461). Similarly, all of the UI Experiments examined 
the treatments’ effects on employment and earnings. 
The 193 social experiments frequently included process analyses 
and benefit-cost analyses. For the completed studies that Greenberg and 
Shroder examine, benefit-cost analyses were conducted in just under 
half of the evaluations. Benefit-cost analysis has become increasingly 
prevalent. 
In general, Greenberg and Shroder find that social experiments have 
become simpler, more streamlined, and cheaper over time. Experiments 
have increasingly tested incremental changes in existing programs, 
rather than testing new programs. Between 1962 and 1974, over four-
fifths of experiments tested new programs, whereas since 1983 only 
one-quarter of experiments completed have tested new programs. This 
change may stem from declining public funds to conduct more ambi-
tious experiments and a perception that incremental changes to existing 
programs are more likely to be implemented. 
The way experiments have been operated also has been stream-
lined. The cost of administering the treatments tested has declined 
because of at least six factors: 1) increased use of administrative data 
rather than the use of more expensive surveys, 2) reduced sample attri-
tion, 3) administration of experiments by agencies already serving the 
target population, 4) shorter follow-up tracking periods, 5) a declining 
number of treatment groups, and 6) more rapid evaluation, comple-
tion, and release of results. As a result both of less expensive treat-
ments and project administration and of simpler project designs, sample 
sizes for treatments have increased (Table 1.1). The median sample size 
for experiments has increased from 401 in the period 1962–1974 to 
870 during 1975–1982 and to 2,312 during 1983–1996 (Greenberg and 
Shroder 2004, pp. 462–465). Because the UI Experiments were look-
ing for treatments that worked, they tested both new programs (self-
employment assistance, reemployment bonuses, and training vouchers) 
and programs with incremental changes (enhanced training, education, 







Social experiments are highly concentrated in certain areas of the 
United States. Although Greenberg and Shroder find that experiments 
have been run in every state except Alaska and Idaho, they also find 
that the same states have participated repeatedly. The nine states that 
participated most frequently in completed experiments were New 
York (27); California (26); Illinois (19); Pennsylvania (19); Ohio (16); 
and Florida, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington, all with 13 each
(Greenberg and Shroder 2004, p. 469). It is thus not surprising that the 
UI Experiments were run in five of these nine states (Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, Florida, Massachusetts, and Washington). In addition, Texas 
unsuccessfully applied to participate in the reemployment bonus dem-
onstrations, and California would have been one of the work sharing 
experimental sites if the experiment had not been canceled. 
The funding source for social experiments has changed over time. 
The federal government has been the dominant funder of experiments, 
but its role has declined: it went from funding 80 percent of experiments 
during 1962–1982 to funding 64 percent during 1983–1996. Over that 
same period, state funding increased from 18 to 40 percent, but most 
of that increase was due to the evaluations of welfare reform under 
state waivers that took place before the enactment of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 1996 (Greenberg 
and Shroder 2004, p. 465). 
The UI Experiments ended without testing other promising treat-
ments for dislocated workers. For example, they did not test the effects 
of providing wage supplements to dislocated workers. A wage supple-
ment experiment for trade-affected workers who found new jobs pay-
ing less than their old ones was required by federal law in the late 
1980s, but the requirement was dropped because states were unwilling 
to participate. A more recent legislative proposal—this one for a wage 
supplement experiment for TAA-eligible workers—instead became an 
entitlement program in 2002. 
Some treatments that have already been tested experimentally have 
not been revisited. Although classroom training has been closely stud-
ied, a number of additional training experiments could be tested. For 
example, researchers could compare alternative training methods (e.g., 
on-the-job training versus classroom training), could vary training by 
duration or intensity, could focus more on incumbent training, could 





ing providers (e.g., nonprofit versus for-profit). A number of compre-
hensive reemployment services also need to be tested or retested using 
experimental methods. 
TARgETINg 
The UI Experiments tested various ES and WIA reemployment ser-
vices and incentives that might help displaced claimants return to work 
more quickly and in some cases increase their earnings. 
The experiments were designed with two types of targeting in mind. 
First, since the goal of the experiments was to find cost-effective treat-
ments, the treatments had to be targeted to the workers for whom they 
would be most cost-effective. Second, even if cost-effective treatments 
could be identified, the limited availability of funding meant that an 
objective targeting mechanism was needed to select and limit the claim-
ants who would be referred to services. 
Targeting thus was an integral part of the UI Experiments. Later 
chapters will show that the experiments’ design included both built-in 
targeting and the use of subgroup analysis in project evaluation to deter-
mine for whom the treatments would be most cost-effective. 
When federal legislation was enacted in the form of WPRS and 
SEA, the legislation mandated targeting, and the Department of Labor 
developed a worker profiling method that was adopted by the partici-
pating state workforce agencies. Worker profiling also would have been 
mandated by reemployment bonus programs that were unsuccessfully 
proposed by both the Clinton and Bush II administrations. 
More recently, new targeting methods have been developed and 
used for TANF, welfare-to-work, and training and education programs 
(Eberts, O’Leary, and Wandner 2002). The Frontline Decision Support 
System (FDSS), which operated in Georgia, incorporated a comprehen-
sive approach to targeting reemployment services for workforce devel-
opment programs at local One-Stops. The FDSS project systematically 
helped dislocated workers return to work by matching them with job 
openings, helping them search for work, and referring them to targeted, 







The United States was an innovator in the development of worker 
profiling methods. Similar approaches have been studied and adopted 
elsewhere, first in Australia and Canada and then in other industrial 
nations (OECD 1998; Rudolph and Konle-Seidl 2005).
Targeting is recognized as an important component of active labor 
market policies throughout the industrialized world. An International 
Labour Organization review of the provision of reemployment services 
in industrialized countries finds that “carefully targeted measures can 
achieve better results than broad measures applying to everyone or 
larger groups” (Auer, Efendioğlu, and Leschke 2005). 
BUDgET NEUTRALITy 
The design of the UI Experiments and the eventual enactment of 
both WPRS and SEA in 1993 were greatly influenced by federal budget 
rules initiated in the 1980s. These rules were designed to reduce the 
budget deficit, and they constrained the development of all new fed-
erally sponsored programs that might eventually be enacted into law, 
including any new approaches to reemployment services. 
The congressional budget process was established by the Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974. Because of persistent federal budget deficits 
in the early 1980s, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known by the name of its spon-
sors as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings [GRH] Act) to impose additional 
discipline on the federal budget. Under the temporary GRH Act, federal 
deficit targets were set to decline each year until they reached the final 
target of a zero deficit by fiscal year 2000. While deficits did shrink 
somewhat under GRH, the budget targets were not met, in large part 
because of economic and other factors that were beyond the control of 
the budget process. 
When GRH did not succeed in bringing the deficit to zero, Congress 
tried a new approach, enacting the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 
1990. The BEA had a two-part approach to enforcing budget discipline: 
it established separate constraints on discretionary and mandatory 
(“direct”) spending, but for both types of spending it only attempted to 
make Congress responsible for actions within its control. The BEA rules 
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were in effect for fiscal years 1991 through 2002. During that period, 
discretionary spending—which annual appropriation acts controlled 
and provided the funds for—was constrained by statutory limits. Viola-
tions of those limits were subject to a process of sequestration, which 
corrected such violations with automatic, across-the-board spending 
reductions for all discretionary spending. For mandatory spending, a 
“pay as you go” (PAYGO) rule placed limits on new legislation that 
was estimated to result in either increased expenditures or decreased 
revenues. Congress could not enact new legislation that would increase 
the cost of entitlement programs, such as the UI program, without pro-
viding simultaneous offsetting reductions in expenditures or increases 
in revenue. If Congress did not adhere to these PAYGO rules, manda-
tory expenditures could also be subject to sequestration (Holtz-Eakin 
2004; Keith 2007). 
By the time the first UI Experiment was being designed, GRH had 
already taken effect. Thus, all of these experiments operated within the 
strictures of these budget limits, and any policy and legislative proposals 
developed were also subject to these limits. New proposals could avoid 
the GRH constraints only by fully paying for themselves within the fed-
eral government sector. As a result, the UI Experiments were designed 
with the goal of being cost-effective, not just to society as a whole, but, 
more restrictively, to the federal government. The evaluations of the 
UI Experiments therefore also examined the cost-effectiveness of these 
interventions, both from the perspective of the federal government as a 
whole and from the perspective of the Department of Labor budget. The 
goal was to have an intervention be at least budget-neutral, in the sense 
that the cost of the intervention and its administration would be offset 
by the benefits to the government, which included reduced UI payments 
and increased tax payments to the U.S. Treasury. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The UI Experiments were designed to enable workforce develop-
ment systems to find new or improved ways to help unemployed work-
ers. The experiments showed that some approaches were cost-effective 





enactment of federal legislation establishing new programs. In other 
cases, completed experiments led to legislative initiatives that were 
not enacted. In still other cases, failed attempts at launching experi-
ments were nonetheless followed by program enactment. And in yet 
other cases, completed experiments have validated findings that had not 
been tested previously through experimentally evaluated demonstration 
projects. 
This book examines the UI Experiments and other research, the pol-
icy proposals to implement research results, and the programs that have 
been implemented. It examines these experiments in the political and 
economic environment in which they were considered and operated. 
That environment included three factors: 1) concerns about worker dis-
location, 2) a restrictive federal budgetary environment, and 3) the need 
for careful targeting to achieve cost-effective results. 
The UI Experiments were targeted at dislocated workers, most of 
whom are eligible for UI benefits. The goal of these demonstrations was 
to assist UI claimants in returning to work by developing or enhanc-
ing reemployment assistance approaches likely to be cost-effective. 
The demonstrations operated in an environment of budget austerity in 
the 1980s, which guided their design. Their budget-neutral design was 
helpful in getting two treatments enacted into law: 1) enhanced com-
prehensive job search assistance and 2) self-employment assistance. 
Budget neutrality also helped to gain bipartisan support for another 
treatment option—targeted reemployment bonuses, which were rec-
ommended for legislative implementation by both the Clinton and the 
Bush administrations. As the UI demonstrations proceeded, it became 
clear that effective targeting of reemployment services was critical for 
developing cost-effective approaches to providing reemployment ser-
vices and for allocating scarce program resources in an environment of 
declining funding. 
This book demonstrates that rigorous research can have an impact 
on employment policy, and indeed, that such research has had that 
effect, especially in the mid-1990s. Conversely, the book also describes 
how employment research can be ignored in developing public policy, 
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Notes 
1. In this work I have chosen to capitalize the term “UI Experiments,” since that is 
the term used by USDOL staff and researchers to bring together the work they did 
in running experiments serving UI claimants and dealing with job search assis-
tance, training, reemployment bonuses, and relocation allowances. 
2. The Unemployment Insurance Service is now called the Office of Workforce 
Security. 
3. At that time, I directed unemployment insurance research and developed the pro-
posal to conduct a multitreatment experiment as an enhancement to the fiscal year 
(FY) 1987 federal budget. 
4. The Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration was approved by the sec-
retary of labor and industry for the state. He was replaced by a new secretary early 
in the operation of the experiment. I attended a conference of state workforce 
administrators at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., and was walking in 
through the lobby when I heard the new secretary call out loudly to me, “Hello, 
Mr. Random Assignment!” Needless to say, the secretary was not a strong sup-
porter of the experiment. 
5. The key staff who worked on most of the UI Experiment projects were Wayne 
Gordon, Jon Messenger, and Wayne Zajac. Other staff members who worked on 
one or more of the projects included Bill Coyne, Norm Harvey, and Doug Scott. 
Many individuals within the Unemployment Insurance Service worked on actu-
arial, budget, legislative, and program implementation issues. For the projects that 
operated in the Office of Policy Development and Research, the key staff were 
Gordon, Messenger, Janet Javar, and Jonathan Simonetta. 
6. Among the computer staff working on the experiments were Jun Chen, Lynn Cao, 
and John Chang. 
7. Because of the decline in temporary layoffs in the past two decades, the percent-
age of UI claimants who have no recall expectation would be much higher now. 
8. In program year (PY) 2007, the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs pro-
vided training to 176,000 individuals who exited the program. 
9. In 1992, the Unemployment Insurance Service developed its first “Mission, Vision, 
Values, Goals” statement. It stated, “The program’s mission is to provide unem-
ployed workers with temporary income support and facilitate reemployment.” I 
was a member of the work group that came up with that language, and even in the 
early 1990s my suggestion to include the words “and facilitate reemployment” 
met with initial resistance (O’Leary and Wandner 1997, pp. 702–703). 
10. A substantial number of American workers never file for UI benefits when they 
become unemployed. Only about one-third of all unemployed workers appear to 
apply for UI benefits. Even among job losers, who are the prime potential UI 
recipient population, only a little over one-half apply (Vroman 1991, pp. 22–24). 
